Abstract Linear cryptanalysis and linear approximation methods in general are among the most important cryptanalysis methods of symmetric ciphers and their components. Recently, these methods have been extended to efficiently exploit multiple linear approximations simultaneously. It is known that high nonlinearity of Boolean functions and S-boxes is a desirable property and that the bent functions offer the strongest resistance against cryptanalysis using single linear approximations. The goal of this paper is to investigate to which extent resistance against the multidimensional extension of the linear cryptanalysis method can be achieved. For this purpose some common highly nonlinear Boolean functions as well as a basic LFSR based key stream generator using a nonlinear filter function are investigated.
Introduction
Linear cryptanalysis method was introduced by Matsui in [1] where two statistical key-recovery attacks on the DES, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, were presented. Later linear approximations have also been used for distinguishing an output sequence of a key stream generator from a truly random sequence.
Enhancements of the linear cryptanalysis method using multiple linear approximations simultaneously were presented by Kaliski and Robshaw in [2] and Biryukov et al. in [3] . The applicability of these methods is in theory, and often also in practice, limited by the requirement of statistical independence of the linear approximations.
Truly multidimensional linear distinguishing attack was introduced by Englund and Maximov in [4] , and the foundations of the statistical analysis were presented by Baignères et al. in [5] . These approaches remained unpractical until in [6] we presented a method for constructing a multidimensional linear approximation of arbitrary dimension from strong single one-dimensional approximations and evaluating its strength as a statistical tool. The new method allows us to select only the strongest linear approximations and in this way reduce the dimension of the value space of the distinguisher. As a result, the computation of the probability distribution of the distinguisher is more flexible compared to the approach of handling the full probability distributions in [4] .
In [6] the new method of multidimensional linear approximation was applied to a key recovery attack of Algorithm 1 type for recovering multiple bits of the key simultaneously. Later in [7] we presented how to evaluate the strength of a multidimensional linear approximation and use it as a statistical distinguisher in Algorithm 2 type key recovery attacks. In both types of attacks, using multiple strong linear approximations resulted in significant savings in data complexity compared to the classical linear cryptanalysis or its previous extensions in [2] and [3] .
The goal of this paper is to investigate and quantify the effect of multidimensional linear approximation to the cryptographic strength of commonly used highly nonlinear functions and building blocks in cryptographic constructions. When considering classical linear cryptanalysis, resistance is achieved by functions with the least correlation (or bias) with linear or affine functions. In multidimensional linear cryptanalysis the concept of correlation, or more accurately the squared correlation, is generalised to and replaced by the 2 -distance between the uniform probability distribution and the probability distribution computed from the multidimensional approximation. We call this measure capacity due to its similarity to the notion of capacity used by Biryukov et al. [3] .
It is known that the vector bent functions offer the best resistance against multidimensional linear cryptanalysis. In this paper we determine the capacity of the distribution of some other common highly nonlinear vector Boolean functions. We also investigate the probability distribution of the basic multidimensional linear distinguisher of the filter generator, see [8] , and calculate its capacity for some highly nonlinear filter functions. In all these examples, we can observe significant reduction in data complexity compared to the one-dimensional linear approximation.
Finally, we investigate compositions of statistical independent cipher components. While in practice multidimensional linear approximations will typically be constructed from strong one linear approximations, it would be possible to chain multidimensional linear approximations of independent cipher layers. We show how the probability distribution of the chained approximation can be determined. We also present a multidimensional form of Piling-up lemma and prove an upper bound to the capacity of chained or parallel multidimensional approximations.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 the basic concepts of vector Boolean functions and related probability distributions are introduced. The theory of multidimensional linear distinguishing attacks is presented in Section 3. The properties of highly nonlinear Boolean functions are studied in Section 4, and they are examined further in the context of a filter key stream generator in Section 5. The results on compositions of multidimensional approximations are presented in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7.
Probability distribution of a Boolean function
We denote the space of n-dimensional binary vectors by F n 2 . The inner product is defined for a
and it is called the correlation of f . A function f : 
, using the inverse of Walsh-Hadamard transform. The convolution of two functions φ :
It is straightforward to verify that then
(1)
For a ∈ F m 2 and f :
Using the inverse Walsh-Hadamard transform we get the following lemma. 
This result can be seen as a special case of the Cramér-Wold theorem [9] .
Multidimensional linear distinguishing attacks
Linear cryptanalysis can be significantly enhanced by using multiple linear approximations as shown most notably in [2] and [3] . However, these approaches were restricted by the assumption that the individual linear approximations are statistically independent. This assumption was also studied by S. Murphy in [10] . Baignères et al. developed the statistical theory of general multidimensional distinguishing [5] . We presented in [6] a multidimensional generalisation of Matsui's Algorithm 1, which does not assume statistical independence of the linear approximations. We extended Matsui's Algorithm 2 to multiple dimensions in [7] and showed that it performs better than the algorithms of [2] and [3] . In this section, we will give the theoretical foundations of the multidimensional linear distinguishing attack. We will define a multidimensional linear approximation as a vector Boolean function, consider the statistical properties of its p.d. and give the definition of capacity, which will be used as the measure of the strength of the multidimensional linear approximation.
where the matrices
, respectively, also called as linear masks. Then main task is to find masks U and W and p.d. p of (4) such that p can be distinguished from θ. By Lemma 2.1 we can construct p using the one-dimensional correlations c(a
Therefore, the problem of finding the multidimensional masks and p is reduced to the problem of searching one-dimensional linear approximations with non-negligible correlations.
The strength of a linear multidimensional approximation is determined by the non-uniformity of its p.d., which is measured using its capacity to be defined next.
The capacity of p with respect to q is defined as
If q = θ is uniform, then C( p, θ) is called the capacity of p and we will denote it by C( p). Then
In [5] , capacity is called as Squared Euclidean
capacity of f and denote it by C( f ).
An equivalent form of the following lemma can be found in [5] . We proved it in [6] based on Lemma 2.1 which implies that
Next we show that the capacity of a vector Boolean function is invariant under bijective transforms of the domain and linear bijective transforms of the codomain. 
Proof We use Lemma 3.1. First, we observe that correlation is invariant under any bijective transform of the input. Then by changing the order of summation appropriately we obtain
where W T is the transpose of W.
In our applications of this theorem the Boolean functions f are linear approximations. Then also W( f • U) is a linear approximation if both W and U are linear transforms.
An important criterion for a good cipher is that its output should look random, that is, its output should be indistinguishable from that of a random source. For a distinguishing attack, we need some data produced by the cipher, for example, key stream words. A properly chosen test statistic uses this data to distinguish the cipher from a random source. The amount of data N needed in the attack is called the data complexity of the attack.
In a general distinguishing problem we must determine whether the given data is drawn from p.d. p or q = p. Baignères et al. proved the following theorem in [5] , where they used the log-likelihood ratio as the distinguisher.
Theorem 3.2 Assume that the p.d.'s p and q are close to each other such that there is
Then the data complexity of a distinguishing p from q is proportional to
Hence, if we want to distinguish a cipher with p.d. p from a random source with uniform p.d., the data complexity is proportional to
It follows that the capacity of the p.d. of a linear approximation represented by (4) determines the strength of the distinguishing attack. Hence the smaller are the capacities of linear approximations of a cipher or its components the higher is the cipher's resistance against linear distinguishing attacks based on such approximations.
Optimal and near optimal capacity of Boolean functions
In this section, we determine the capacities of some known examples of highly nonlinear vector Boolean functions, which offer strong resistance against classical linear attacks. First we examine the best possible resistance against multidimensional cryptanalysis and determine what is the least possible value that can be reached simultaneously by all linear approximations of a vector Boolean function. We will show that the vector bent functions achieve this minimum value of capacities.
Optimal capacity and bent functions
We start by giving a condition for a vector Boolean function f : F n 2 → F m 2 to have optimal resistance against m-dimensional linear cryptanalysis. The following theorem can be seen as a multidimensional extension of Parseval's theorem. Let us first present a small technical lemma which will be needed in the proof of the theorem. 
Proof By Lemma 3.1
Let a ∈ F n 2 be non-zero. The number of such a is 2 m − 1. Using the above technical lemma and Parseval's theorem we obtain
from where the claim follows.
We say that a Boolean function f :
m , where l ≥ m. By the preceding theorem, optimal resistance against m-dimensional linear cryptanalysis is achieved if and only if
m . Bent functions can be defined as follows: a Boolean vector function f : 
Power functions
In this section we determine capacities of n-dimensional linear approximations of power functions of the form
By Theorem 3.1 it suffices to determine capacities of approximations of the form x d ⊕ U x. Using our methods, we can only determine the capacities in the case where U is defined as multiplication ux in F 2 n by an element u ∈ F 2 n .
By fixing the basis in the field F 2 n , the field is identified with the vector space F n 2 . Without loss of generality, we assume that the inner product a · x, for a, x ∈ F n 2 , is defined as
where Tr(·) denotes the absolute trace in F 2 n . For any Boolean vector function f :
) is a Boolean function. We can now state the following theorem.
Proof By the assumption gcd(d, 2
Let us now consider the known examples of highly nonlinear functions x −1 and x 3 . The former satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.3 always, while the latter satisfies them only for odd n. Clearly, the case d = 3 generalizes to any d = 2 k + 1, gcd(2k, n) = 1. We get the following corollary. Hence, the data requirement counted as the number of known plaintextciphertext pairs of distinguishing an n-dimensional S-box x d , where d is as above, from a random permutation using n-dimensional linear attack is independent of the dimension. On the other hand, the time and memory complexity of such an attack increases exponentially with n as shown in [7] .
Capacities of distributions from filter generators
Let us study a basic example of a key stream generator (k.s.g.) consisting of an LFSR with k state blocks of size l bits each, and a filter function f :
where n is a multiple of l and m ≤ n. Let the LFSR recursion be k j=0 α j s t+ j = 0, where α j ∈ F 2 n and α k = 1 and α 0 = 0. At time t, let z t = f (S t ), where the input S t is some fixed subset of the LFSR state blocks. We use the following notation: if α ∈ F 2 l and x ∈ F n 2 , the multiplication αx means that we multiply each l-bit block of x by α. Therefore, k j=0 α j S t+ j = 0. Denote the set of indices corresponding to the non-zero recursion coefficients by J = { j = 0, . . . , k : α j = 0}. Our goal is to determine the distribution of j∈J z t+ j , which has been successfully used as a distinguisher for such k.s.g. [8] . Given a fixed t ≥ 0, let us denote x j = S t+ j , for all j ∈ J. Then j∈J α j x j = 0. Assume x j , j ∈ J, are statistically independent and uniformly distributed. Denote J = J \ {k}. Given a one-dimensional mask w ∈ F m 2 , the correlation c(w) between w · j∈J z t+ j and 0 can be calculated as follows:
Since multiplication is linear in F 2 n we have that for any coefficient α ∈ F 2 n there is a linear mapping A such that
where A T denotes the transpose of A. Therefore, for each α ∈ F 2 n and u ∈ F n 2 there is a unique mask
Therefore, having non-binary coefficients in the LFSR recursion equation makes the searching for the strong linear approximations more difficult. It is not enough to find a strong input and output mask pair (u, w) and the corresponding correlation, but also all the other mask pairs (u α j , w), α j ∈ F n 2 \ {0, 1}, must hold with a nonnegligible correlation. An example of such a cipher is SNOW 2.0 [11] , whose linear recursion is given by s t+16 ⊕ α −1 s t+11 ⊕ s t+2 ⊕ αs t = 0. Here α ∈ F 2 32 is a root of a primitive polynomial of degree 4 in F 2 8 and especially, α, α −1 = 0, 1. For example, when searching for a strong linear approximation for SNOW 2.0 in [12] , one has to search for masks pairs (u, w) that also had strong correlations for (u α , w) and (u α −1 , w).
For simplicity, we now consider only binary coefficients for the LFSR recursion. In this special case we have
Formula (10) was also proved in [8] . Yet another way to see it is as a variation of general correlation theorems given in [13] . Using this formula we can find the correlations c(w i ) corresponding to given linearly independent one-dimensional mask w i , i = 1, . . . , m, and then we can construct a linear vector Boolean function
Using this multidimensional linear approximation we can launch a distinguishing attack, where the data complexity is inversely proportional to the capacity of this key stream approximation.
In the next sections we consider some specific examples of k.s.g.'s and the capacities of the distinguishers of the form (11) . Among the examples are the highly nonlinear filter functions f (x) = x −1 and f (x) = x 3 . We will calculate the correlations based on (9) , and restrict to the special case where |J| = 3. Then the recursion equation becomes s t ⊕ s t+r ⊕ s k = 0, for some 0 < r < k. We will denote s t = x and s t+r = y, respectively. Then by (9) we obtain
As the third example, we consider bent fuctions. In this case we can calculate the capacity for any |J| ≥ 3. In all three examples, in the case |J| = 3, the amount of data needed for the attack is approximately 2 2n−m . If n = 2m, which is the largest possible value of m given n for bent functions to exist, a multidimensional distinguishing attack takes 2 3m words of data whereas the one-dimensional attack needs 2 4m words of data.
Formula (10) is particularly useful for functions with simple Walsh spectrum. In Section 5.4 we will use this approach to calculate the distinguisher capacities for filter functions f such that w · f is plateaued, for all w = 0.
Filter function based on the S-box of AES
It is sufficient to study x −1 instead of the actual S-box as making a linear transformation of full rank of a function does not affect its statistical properties. 
The last equation has either 0 or 2 solutions x, for every y = 0, and it has two solutions if and only if Tr(1) = 0 that is, when n is even. Hence,
Then N 0 is given by
Now we calculate the N η for η = 0. Then x = 0, y = 0 and x = y, and consequently, y = 1 η
. We have that
This has two solutions x for each y = 0 if and only if Tr((1 ⊕ ηy) −1 ) = 0. Note that the solutions must also satisfy x = 0 and x = y. The function
is a bijection. Trace is a linear mapping so #{y|Tr(y) = 0} = 2 n−1 . We obtain 2
n − 2, since the function Tr(1/(1 ⊕ ηy)) = 0 for y = η −1 . If n is even, then both values which this function never takes, have trace equal to zero, and we obtain N η = 2 n − 4.
Combining the results we get that the correlation for all non-zero one-dimensional output masks w is c(w) = 2 2−n , if n is even and c(w) = 2 1−n , if n is odd. The claim follows now from Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1.
Function x
3 as a filter function for any invertible mask W.
Proof We extend w ∈ F m 2 to F n 2 by appending zeroes to it if necessary. Using (12) we get
For any fixed y = 0, the function x → x 2 y ⊕ y 2 x is linear in F By Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1, we get the claim.
A bent function as a filter function
We state the following result: Proof Denote the right hand side of (9) by c |J| (w). If |J| = 3, then using (12) we get
Since f is bent it is perfect nonlinear and therfore the sum over y is equal to 2 n , if x = 0, and zero otherwise. Hence, c 3 (w) = 2 −n (−1) w· f (0) . If |J| = 4, we obtain using the same property of bent functions that
Let us now consider the general case and rewrite the variables x j , j ∈ J as x 1 , . . . , x |J| . For |J| ≥ 5, we get
from where the claims follow.
Plateaued function
Plateaued functions were introduced in [14] and are defined as follows:
It follows from the definition that the order of a plateaued function is even. Moreover, by Parseval's theorem, the number of non-zero elements in the Walsh spectrum of an rth order plateaued Boolean function is 2 r . For example, a bent Boolean function of n variables is nth order plateaued, and the functions w · f (x), for f (x) = x 3 in odd dimension n and w = 0, are (n − 1)th order plateaued. Next we show how to use formula (10) directly to obtain some of the same and some new complementary results to Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Let the number |J| of non-zero recurrence coefficients be even and let f : F Using Lemma 3.1 we now get the following theorem. This result is in conformance with Theorem 5.3 for bent functions with r = n and complements Theorem 5.2 with r = n − 1 by giving the capacities also for all even |J| ≥ 4. We also observe that the capacities for |J| values 3 and 4 are equal in these cases.
Constructing multidimensional linear approximations
One approach to constructing multidimensional linear approximations is to search for strong one-dimensional linear approximations over the whole system and use Lemma 2.1 to construct the multidimensional approximations. Since many linear distinguishing attacks have already concentrated on finding the best one-dimensional mask, this can be seen as a practical way to apply the theory, in particular, when several approximations about equally large correlation have been found, see e.g. [6] . A second approach, taken in [4] , is to consider p.d. of linear approximation of each part of the system separately and then use convolution to obtain the p.d. of the entire linear approximation. Let us first formulate a generalisation of Piling-up lemma [1] to the case of multidimensional linear approximation. In the one-dimensional case, the capacity of the convolution of two distributions is the product of the capacities of the distributions. Unfortunately, this useful fact cannot be generalised to multiple dimensions. Already in two dimensions, it is possible to find two functions f and g with non-zero capacity such that the capacity of f ⊕ g is equal to zero. For example, we can select f = ( f , 0) and g = (0, g ), where f and g are balanced Boolean functions. Then p( f ⊕ g) is uniform. Hence, the left-hand side of (13) given by the following theorem can be equal to zero while the right-hand side is not. 
Proof Let us first observe that, by the definition of convolution,
2 . Then using (1) and (3) we get c(a
To compute the capacity of f ⊕ g we use Lemma 3.1 to get
This theorem is useful when combining linear approximations of different, presumably statistically independent parts of a cipher construction. Sometimes it can also be used to give a fairly good estimate of the capacity of a linear approximation of a composition of two functions, e.g., rounds of a block cipher in the similar manner as Piling-up lemma was used in Matsui's linear cryptanalysis of the DES [1] .
The exact value of the correlation c(u ⊕ w · (g • f )) of a one-dimensional linear approximation of a composition of two Boolean functions f :
can be computed as follows
This equality cannot be generalised to the multidimensional case just by replacing correlations with capacities. Instead, the following equivalent form of it
has a multidimensional counterpart which is given in the following theorem. 
is a p.d. and and the capacity of p(U
Proof Let η ∈ F m 2 be arbitrary. Then by Lemma 2.1
By Lemma 4.1 it holds that
for any a ∈ F n 2 , a = 0. Using this and Lemma 2.1 again, we obtain Similarly to the proof of Theorem 6.1, by using (14), we can prove that
In Sections 4 and 5 we presented examples of cryptographic building blocks where strong resistance against one-dimensional cryptanalysis will be weakened as the dimension of the linear cryptanalysis is increased. Such building blocks can not usually be attacked directly but in combinations with other buiding blocks. In this section we computed distributions of multidimensional linear approximations for some combinations which are in use in cipher constructions and derived upper bounds to their capacities (13) and (15) in terms of the capacities of the linear approximations over the buiding blocks.
Conclusions
Simultaneous use of multiple linear approximations has recently been shown to significantly improve the performance of linear attacks by reducing data complexity. In the multidimensional distinguishing attacks the data complexity is proportional to the inverse of the capacity, which is the measure of nonuniformity of the probability distribution of the distinguisher. In this paper we calculated the capacity of some concrete multidimensional linear distinguishers related to highly nonlinear components or constructions using such components. While in all cases the data complexity is reduced when multidimensional distinguisher is used, resistance against such attacks is still possible to achieve in constructions where the distinguisher takes on values in a relatively small space compared to the input data space or the state space of the cryptographic construction. Bent functions and filter generators are typical examples of such constructions. On the other hand, we showed examples of highly nonlinear bijective power functions that can be distinguished from uniformly distributed random functions using any nontrivial multidimensional linear approximation using a constant number of known plaintext independently of the size of the domain of the function.
In this study we considered only the aspect of data complexity and calculated its values. Time and memory complexity of a cryptanalytic attack are also important. In the case of multidimensional cryptanalysis they set an upperbound to the size of the probability distribution of the distinguisher that is feasible to analyse in practice. For example, although we showed that bijective power functions are analysable using constant amount of data, the memory requirement becomes soon infeasible as the size of the function grows.
